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Book Review
Trashing Federal Jurisdiction
FEDERAL JURISDICTION:

By Howard
Charlottesville, Va.: The Michie

POLICY AND PRACTICE.

Fink* and Mark V. Tushnet.**
Co. 1984. Pp. xx, 907. $32.50.

Reviewed by Michael E. Solimine***

INTRODUCTION

With several prominent textbooks on the market covering federal jurisdiction,' the publication of yet another book seems to call
for express justification. Professors Howard Fink and Mark V.
Tushnet weigh in with the latest treatise, FederalJurisdiction: Policy and Practice,without providing such an explanation. Nevertheless, their effort is welcome. As the title implies, Fink and Tushnet
employ common case analysis of jurisdictional questions. What is
more, they provocatively discuss the policies expressly or implicitly
underlying federal jurisdiction doctrine.
Especially remarkable, however, is the pedigree of this work.
Professor Fink teaches and publishes on traditional legal topics.2
Professor Tushnet, however, is one of the "leading members" 3 of
the controversial Critical Legal Studies (CLS) school. CLS writers,
though difficult to characterize as a group, take steps beyond their
* Joseph S.Platt-Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur Professor of Law, The Ohio State
University.
** Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
*** Member of the Ohio Bar. B.A., Wright State University (1978); J.D., Northwestern
University (1981).
1. Kg., P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1973 & Supp. 1981) [here-

inafter cited

as HART & WECHSLER]; D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS:

CASES AND

MATERIALS (3d ed. 1982); W. MCCORMACK, FEDERAL COURTS (1984). See also C.
WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS (4th ed. 1983) (hombook); M. REDISH, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER (1980) (essays).

2. See, eg., Fink, IndispensablePartiesand the ProposedAmendment to FederalRule
19, 74 YALE L.J. 403 (1965).
3. Hutchinson & Monahan, Law, Politics and the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REv. 199, 201 (1984).
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ideological ancestors in the Legal Realism movement of the early
twentieth century; they irreverently "trash" the legal concepts and
thinking that the vast majority of practitioners and law teachers in
this country employ. In particular, the CLS movement focuses on
the contradictions in modem liberal thought that it finds embodied
in our judicial system, and seeks to expose many liberal notions as
merely rationalizations for the illegitimate social and economic hierarchies of modem capitalist society.4 According to CLS scholars,
the ruling order shapes supposedly neutral rules and procedures to
preserve its hegemony. "Thus," one CLS writer argues, "the course
on federal courts is best seen as the purest of contentless legalist
rituals . . . 5
Tushnet's collaboration with Fink in a traditional legal text undoubtedly will perplex and disappoint his CLS colleagues.
Tushnet's seeming apostasy does not, however, warrant a reaction
of alarm within CLS, inasmuch as his past publications include several traditional analyses of federal jurisdiction as well as some of the
most important CLS work.' After considering Fink and Tushnet's
analytical viewpoint and the substance of their work, I will return
to the apparent contradiction of a CLS writer authoring a text
about the "purest of contentless legalist rituals."7
I.
Law school courses and textbooks treating federal jurisdiction
and procedure generally lack unifying themes, perhaps because they
address procedural rather than substantive issues. The leading
casebook, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal
System,8 simply states that it will explore problems arising from the
distribution of power in a federal system of government.9 More recent writers emphasize the tensions in allocating jurisdiction between federal and state courts, and in federal court deference to
4. A helpful sampling of articles on the controversial CLS school appears in Critical
Legal Studies Symposium, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984).
5. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293, 319 n.65 (1984).
6. Compare Tushnet, Why the Debate Over Congress' Power to Restrict the Jurisdiction
of the FederalCourts is Unending, 72 GEO. L.J. 1311 (1984) and Tushnet, The Sociology of
Article III" A Response to ProfessorBrilmayer, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1698 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Tushnet, Sociology] and Tushnet, Constitutionaland StatutoryAnalyses in the Law of
FederalJurisdiction, 25 UCLA L. REV. 1301 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Tushnet, Constitutional and Statutory Analyses] (traditional approaches) with Tushnet, A Marxist Analysis of
American Law, 1 MARXIST PERSPECTIVES 96 (1978) (nontraditional approach).
7. Kelman, supra note 5, at 319 n.65.
8. Supra note 1.
9. Id. at xix-xx.
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state courts or state law. 10
Fink and Tushnet expand on the latter theme. They state that
their "point of view" is that "[t]he words of article III [of the Constitution], providing for the jurisdiction of the federal courts, are
opaque" (p. vii). Thus, it is impossible to find the" 'true meaning' "
of the words; "[r]ather the search is for the choices that were open
to the drafters" of article III (p. vii). The authors explain that the
scope of federal jurisdiction is shaped by continual tensions, those
between "localist" and "centralist" tendencies, and those embodied
in the separation of powers "between the federal courts and the
other branches of government" (p. vii). Rather than advocate the
primacy of any particular viewpoint, the authors call for a "dialogue" on the issues (p. 7).
Most scholars, I suspect, will have little difficulty with these
statements. Regardless of what else may be said about interpre-

tivist, structural, doctrinal, or ethical approaches to constitutional
interpretation,"1 Fink and Tushnet correctly observe that the Con-

stitution does not "specify the allocation of [jurisdiction] between
lower federal and state courts" (p. 3). Article III, they contend,
"embraced a compromise between" the competing tendencies, leaving it to Congress, judges, and lawyers-the "policymakers"-to
crystallize and decide particular jurisdictional disputes, either
10. See, e-g., M.

REDISH, supra note 1.
11. For examples of the renaissance in constitutional studies and divergent viewpoints,
see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); P. BOBBrrr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE
(1982); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DLSTRusT (1980); M. PERRY, THE CONSTrrUTION, THE
COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982); JudicialReview and the Constitution - The Text and
Beyond, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 443 (1983); ConstitutionalAdjudicationand Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 260 (1981); JudicialReview Versus Democracy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1
(1981). With the exception of Raoul Berger, most writers reject the strictly historical or interpretivist approach. See, ag., Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REv. 781 (1983). Even Berger questions
whether the history of article III is accessible. See McAffee, Bergerv. The Supreme Court The Implicationsof His Exceptions Clause Odyssey, 9 U. DAYTON L. REv. 219 (1984).
On the other hand, courts and commentators agree that drafters' intent is critical to
proper statutory analysis. See Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1745-46 & n.5 (1984)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("We do not construe constitutional provisions... the way we do
statutes, whose drafters can be expected to indicate with some comprehensiveness and exactitude the conduct they wish to forbid or control ..
"); Solimine, Adjudication of Federal
CivilRights Actions in Ohio Courts, 9 U. DAYTON L. REv. 39, 50 n.62 (1983) ("Of course, the
extent to which the intent of the Framers. . . can or should be relevant to the interpretation
of the amendment is the subject of the current debate. . . . On the other hand, there seems
to be much less controversy in divining the intent of the Framers to determine if exclusive
jurisdiction of a certain statute lies in the federal courts."). Though Fink and Tushnet do not
expressly address the point, they seem to be willing to rely on the intent of the drafters of
statutes, to the extent it may be discovered (eg., p. 109) (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)).
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through legislation or litigation (p. 5).12 Thus, Fink and Tushnet
essentially adopt a structural or doctrinal view of article III that is
not bounded by the history or the "opaque" language of the
Constitution.
They also do not hide their ideology. The authors give lengthy
quotations to support their premises from articles by Abram Chayes
(p. 663) 13 and Burt Neuborne (p. 9),14 which, respectively, contend
that federal court litigation does and should address broad, institutional issues usually left for resolution to other branches of government, and that state courts are unwilling or incapable of adequately
adjudicating federal constitutional questions. Likewise, the authors
also adopt traditional liberal positions when criticizing proposals to
curtail diversity jurisdiction (p. 403).
The objective manner in which Fink and Tushnet present these
issues is compelling. For example, the authors clearly sympathize
with Neuborne, but rather than uncritically endorse his views, they
question some of his assumptions and argue that "[t]he question [of
state court competence] is closer than Neuborne suggests" (p. 16).
Similarly, while they endorse the retention of diversity jurisdiction
and present empirical studies of lawyers to support their position,
they also present opposing views (pp. 403-06). i" Although the au12. I have described elsewhere the intent of the article III drafters regarding the obligation of state tribunals to consider federal constitutional questions, popularly known as the
"Madisonian Compromise." Solimine & Walker, ConstitutionalLitigation in Federaland
State Courts: An EmpiricalAnalysis of JudicialParity, 10 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 213, 215,
221 n.50 (1983). Article III's language also reflects that the Framers, with very limited exceptions, never considered many common jurisdictional questions, such as abstention, concurrent jurisdiction, and federal common law. See Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal
CourtJurisdiction: A Guided Questfor the OriginalUnderstandingofArticle III, 132 U. PA.
L. REV.741 (1984).
13. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281,
1282 (1976).
14. Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977). I previously have
questioned the social science evidence upon which Neuborne bases his assumptions. Solimine
& Walker, supra note 12. See also Bator, The State Courts andFederalConstitutionalLitigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605 (1981) (arguing that Neuborne's arguments for federal
court superiority ignore the institutional reality of state and federal issues arising together,
particularly in state enforcement proceedings involving a federal question, and do not justify
federal intervention); Tushnet, Constitutionaland Statutory Analyses, supra note 6, at 1307
n.35 ("[S]tate hostility to federal law. . . may not be as great as some fear.").
15. The authors support other important points with empirical evidence. They argue
that judges interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) should not fear opening the floodgates of
§ 1983 litigation, inasmuch as plaintiffs rarely win § 1983 actions (p. 698). See Briscoe v.
Lahue, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 1122-23 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Eisenberg, Section 1983:
DoctrinalFoundationsand an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REv.482, 522 (1982).
They also point out that the paucity of successful habeas corpus suits undermines the
"floodgates" argument in that context (pp. 815-16). Without disputing this data, I do not
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thors oppose using historical evidence to interpret article III, they
present a concise and accurate summary of the history of the federal
court system (pp. 5-7). Even when history supports their argument,
as with the indisputable intent of the Reconstruction Congress to
expand the power of federal courts, they question whether such intent can or should be controlling a century later (p. 95).16
Fink and Tushnet thus emphasize the policies underlying jurisdictional questions while considering history and empirical evidence
as well. Their perspective is unabashedly liberal, but they fairly
present opposing viewpoints. They create an appropriate framework for presenting the issues of federal jurisdiction and procedure.
II.
The authors of any casebook are constrained by the skeleton
of cases they choose to reproduce. Even so, different approaches
are possible. Professor Robert Sedler has identified three options:
"(1) 'cases, cases and more cases'; (2) 'cases and substantive commentary'; and (3) 'cases and commentary with direction and

probing.'

"17

Fink and Tushnet have chosen the third option. While the cases
they reprint are edited "less tightly" (p. viii) than usual, the text is a
lean 900 pages. Moreover, the authors use a wide variety of lower
court cases and secondary sources to augment the traditional,
"leading" Supreme Court decisions. Rather than simply citing
masses of cases and law review articles,"8 the authors summarize
the commentators' views and the holdings of the cases. Further,
necessarily agree with the implications drawn by Fink and Tushnet. For example, even meritless suits tie up the courts and litigants, and many civil suits settle out of court. Nevertheless, I applaud their use of empirical evidence, as I did when evaluating Neuborne's article.
See Solimine & Walker, supra note 12, at 225. Their use of such evidence demonstrates a
sharp contrast with the many CLS Writers who loathe empirical or social science studies. See
Trubek, Where the Action Isv CriticalLegal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REv. 575
(1984). See also Tushnet, Post-RealistLegal Scholarship, 1980 Wis. L. Rnv. 1383, 1400 (critiquing "Anglo-American tradition of empiricism" and advocating application of contemporary European social theory to American law).
16. Professor Redish, by comparison, believes that modem courts should examine the
intent of the Reconstruction Congress as the overriding factor in deciding jurisdictional questions. See Solimine & Walker, supra note 12, at 223-25 (discussion of Redish's views). Cf.
Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57, 57 (1984) ("Critical legal writers pay
a lot of attention to history."); supra note 11 (discussing use of history in constitutional and
statutory interpretation).
17. Sedler, Book Review, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1020, 1026 (1981) (reviewing seven constitutional law textbooks).
18. Despite its general usefulness and depth of treatment, certain portions of HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 1, suffer from too much citation and too little analysis.
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Fink and Tushnet include many detailed hypothetical questions.
This useful pedagogical tool enables students to apply jurisdictional
principles outside the context of the reprinted cases. While not as
lengthy, their postcase notes rival the quality of those in Hart &
Wechsler.1 9
The "policy" approach of Fink and Tushnet, however, does not
distort the substantive format of the text. As in most federal jurisdiction casebooks, the authors cover familiar ground in chapters on
the definition of a "federal question" under article III and the corresponding jurisdictional statute, 20 the scope of the civil rights statutes, particularly section 1983,21 the eleventh amendment,22 Erie
questions, standing, and limitations on the exercise of federal court
jurisdiction.
Reserving discussion of article III standing questions, which
often are the starting point of constitutional law textbooks, until the
eighth chapter does not detract from the text's organization. The
authors first address the "tensions" between federal and state law
and between federal courts and Congress. They then devote an entire chapter to federal civil rights actions. In later chapters procedure in federal courts is extensively discussed; these chapters
examine the intricacies of diversity jurisdiction, various provisions
of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and appellate review. This organization is superior to Hart & Wechsler, which covers all of these
themes in a somewhat disjointed fashion.23
The usefulness of Fink and Tushnet's text is illustrated by their
treatment of congressionally or judicially created barriers to the
power of federal courts, the most controversial topic in federal jurisdiction today. This issue is approached in a number of ways. In
19. See Monaghan, Book Review, 87 HAav. L. REv. 889, 890 n.10 (1974) (reviewing
HART & WECHSLER).

20. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
22. The authors observe that the "[c]ase law of the eleventh amendment is replete with
historical anomalies, internal inconsistencies, and senseless distinctions" (p. 137).
23. For example, HART & WECHSLER treats civil rights matters throughout the book,
and its discussion of the eleventh amendment is truncated. Moreover, its sequence of chapters lacks a logical order; chapters on the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and
Supreme Court review of state court decisions are presented early in the book. See
Monaghan, supra note 19, at 895. Fink and Tushnet only briefly mention original jurisdiction (p. 818), and discuss appellate review in their last chapter. Aside from the logic of
treating these matters last, it seems sensible to limit discussion of such issues in a text primarily directed toward students, who rarely will use such materials in practice. The authors say
that they only present these topics to guide practitioners on preserving issues for Supreme
Court review and because they raise federalism and separation of powers problems (p. 826).
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addition to discussing the ability of Congress to restrict federal
court jurisdiction, the authors address how the often vague jurisdictional statutes should be construed and what presumptions should
govern their interpretation. The authors reject the "clear statement" rules that require an express indication that Congress intended to grant federal courts power over the litigation in question
(p. 142), inasmuch as a "clear statement" rule generally will restrict
federal court jurisdiction.2 4 Fink and Tushnet suggest an approach
that most closely implements congressional intent; usually this
means that broader jurisdiction is warranted (pp. 22, 30-31, 55,
476).25
Equally stimulating is the authors' discussion of the Supreme
Court's "political question" doctrine. They acknowledge that the
Court uses this device to avoid addressing "hot issues," but criticize
the doctrine as being "fuzzy," believing that the Court uses the
doctrine to cloak the actual reason for avoidance of the issue in a
"more typical legal concern" (p. 214). As an alternative, Fink and
Tushnet propose a formulation in which federal courts would "find
an issue to be committed to the political branches only where the
political constraints on their actions make it unlikely that they will
decide the issue in a way that threatens individual liberty" (p. 220).
This definition, they argue, "has the advantage of linking the primarily structural concerns of the separation of powers to the goal
that separation of powers serves" (p. 220). They candidly acknowledge, however, that it would introduce the complexities of an indepth analysis into a currently "manageable" test, that essentially
examines whether the text of the Constitution commits the question
to resolution by either the President or Congress (p. 220).26
24. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 674-77 & n.17 (1974) (eleventh amendment held to preserve state immunity from suit in federal court in the absence of express
abridgement by Congress). Justice William H. Rehnquist, a pariah to liberal academicians,
e.g., Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquis" A Preliminary View, 90 HARv. L. REv. 293 (1976),
authored the Edelman opinion. It is a measure of Fink and Tushnet's objectivity that they
give prominent and at times favorable treatment to Rehnquist opinions (pp. 56-57, 67-73,
273-74, 793-810, 829-34) despite Tushnet's characterization of Rehnquist as the court's
"most reactionary member." Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 3, at 218 (quoting
Tushnet, Corporationsand Free Speech, in THE PoLrIcs OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 253 (D. Kairys ed. 1982)).
25. See also Tushnet, Constitutionaland Statutory Analyses, supra note 6 (elaborating
broader jurisdiction ideas).
26. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1962). Fink and Tushnet are not alone in calling for the abolition of the political question
doctrine. See, eg., De Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en
bane) (the uncertainty of the doctrine makes it susceptible to indiscriminate and overbroad
application).
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Likewise, Fink and Tushnet trace the somewhat inscrutable law
of standing from the liberal rule of Flast v. Cohen 7 to "Flast's demise" (p. 304) in more recent cases. They are clearly unsympathetic to the Court's most recent approach to the strict "injury" and
"causation in fact" requirements, exemplified in Allen v. Wright,2 8
in which the Court held that the parents of black school children
had no standing to challenge the granting of tax credits to schools
with racially exclusionary practices. While they argue that these
decisions are not "directly linked to a 'conservative-liberal' dimension," they find the current Court "conservative. . . on all the issues raised in its standing cases" (p. 319). The authors argue that
the Court should have reached the merits of these cases, 2 9 and imply that if the Court had done so it would have reached a conservative result (p. 323). 30
Similar themes emerge in the authors' discussion of limitations
on the power of federal courts "to assure adherence to norms of
national law" (p. 615). Considered are the Younger 1 and Pullman32 abstention doctrines and the Court's recent restrictive approach to the availability of habeas corpus in federal courts. While
conceding that Younger was probably decided correctly on its facts
(p. 625), they contend that "nothing very powerful emerges, aside
from the rhetoric" (p. 638) when the Younger line of cases is taken
as a unit. The authors do, however, make appropriate reference to
the federalism arguments that support such limitations (e.g., pp.
616, 673, 695, 744). One way to resolve the dispute over some of
these issues, as the authors suggest elsewhere,3 3 is to defer to congressional intent embodied in the jurisdictional and habeas corpus
statutes (pp. 693-94, 781). Consideration of this intent, they argue,
would usually result in a less restrictive abstention doctrine and a
27. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
28. 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984).
29. However, the authors are restrained in their critique of Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978), in which the court took a liberal standing
approach to reach the merits and uphold the constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act (pp.
321-22). This approach to standing parallels the authors' advocacy of dialogue on the substantive issues raised by particular cases (p. 7).
30. Some political scientists have documented a link between the Justices' votes on
standing, similar cases, or on certiorari petitions and their generally conservative or liberal
voting records. See D. PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT (1980); Rathjen & Spaeth, Access to the Federal Courts: An Analysis ofBurger Court
Policy Making, 23 AM. J. POL. Sci. 360 (1979).
31. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
32. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
33. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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broader habeas corpus approach. Although such an approach is
outwardly reasonable, it is constrained by the difficulty in ascertaining congressional intent.34 Perhaps the presumptions used for interpreting such statutes would operate here.3 5
Finally, Fink and Tushnet's discussions of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, res judicata, and collateral estoppel must be mentioned.
Such a lengthy discussion, over 200 pages, is usually left to texts on
those specific topics. The authors justify the inclusion on the basis
that procedural devices are intimately connected to the usual realworld jurisdictional questions (p. vii). This position is quite defensible. An instructor can disregard these passages in the text should he
find them unimportant.
III.
There may be several reasons why Professor Tushnet did not
take an opportunity to "trash" federal jurisdiction in this textbook.
One that immediately comes to mind is money. It is extremely
doubtful that a CLS tract on federal jurisdiction would find a market.3 6 Another possible explanation is the moderating influence of
Professor Fink, who apparently has been impervious to the CLS
influence of his coauthor.
More specifically, Tushnet has managed to integrate his CLS
work with more traditional analyses of jurisdictional issues. In a
recent article, Tushnet justified an extensive analysis of the Supreme
Court's decisions in Engle v. Isaac3 7 and Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,3 both also treated in the
textbook, as a "descriptive project. . . to discover the unexpressed
assumptions on which the entire Supreme Court and most commentators are agreed." 39 Tushnet identifies these assumptions as embodiments and products of the inherently contradictory norms in a
34. See, ag., Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 501-02 (1982) (discussing
difficulty in discerning congressional intent regarding whether exhaustion of state administrative remedies is a prerequisite to a § 1983 action); see also supra note 11 (contrasting importance of drafters' intent in interpreting Constitution and statutes).
35. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
36. See Sedler, supra note 17, at 1021 ("Casebooks that will not sell will not be published, regardless of their academic quality. Authors must, therefore, package their
casebooks so as to enhance marketability.").
37. 456 U.S. 107 (1982) (habeas corpus case).
38. 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (holding portions of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act

unconstitutional).
39. Tushnet, CriticalLegal Studies and ConstitutionalLaw: An Essay in Deconstruction,
36 STAN. L. REv. 623, 627 (1984).
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liberal, capitalist culture.'
Elsewhere, he has criticized the
Supreme Court's article III standing doctrines, arguing that they
fail to reflect the sociological realities of litigation.4 1
I have some doubt whether other CLS writers will be comfortable with this writing.42 But the loss to CLS is a gain to the more
traditional American practitioners and law teachers. This wellwritten text deserves a place alongside Hart & Wechsler on our
bookshelves.

40. Id. at 635-39, 646.
41. Tushnet, Sociology, supra note 6, at 1708-21; see Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come
Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAw & Soc'y REv. 95 (1974);
Wasby, How Planned is "PlannedLitigation?", 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 83.
42. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.

